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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE
STATUTORY TERMINATION OF MORTGAGE LIENS
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held unconstitutional
Pennsylvania statutes designed to eradicate mortgage liens fifty years after
maturity of the mortgage debt.1 In view of the fact that similar Florida
statutes 2 have never been tested as to their constitutionality, it is the pur-
pose of this comment to investigate the various statutes dealing with
elimination of old mortgage liens, the constitutional problems involved
in these-statutes, and the views of the Florida court upon such problems,
Most states have sought to deal with the troublesome problem of old,
outstanding, or "stale" mortgages by statute. These statutes may be classi-
fied generally as (1) statutes of limitation, (2) statutes defining a market-
able title, and (3) statutes dealing with ttle procedural aspects of extinguish-
ment of the lien.
In states adhering to the lien theory of mortgages, the debt and the
lien are considered as being separate and distinct phases of the mortgage.
Thus the courts have allowed the foreclosure of a lien even after the debt
has been barred by the applicable statute of limitation,' such remedy
probably being allowed due to the early aversion of the courts to statutes
of limitation. 4 Having the separate phases in mind, some states have seen
fit to provide a statute of limitation for the lien, separate and distinct
from the statute of limitation governing the debt.5 Where separate periods
of limitation are so provided, the statute controlling the existence of the
lien generally makes provision that the lien may be extended by recording
an agreement to that effect.' In considering this provision, some courts
have concluded that such statutes are not statutes of limitation, but rather
1. PA. S'rAT. ANN. Tit. 68, §§ 451-457 (Cum. Supp. 1949), Girard Trust Co. v.
Pennsylvania RR., 364 Pa. 576, 73 A.2d 371 (1950).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 95.28-95.34 (1949). Section 95.28 provides, "The lien of a
mortgage . . . shall terminate . . . after the expiration of the following periods ....
(I) If the final maturity . . . is ascertainable . . . twenty years after the date of such
maturity; (2) If the finalmaturity - . . is not ascertainable .. . twenty years from the date
of the mortgage."
3. Bank of Wildwood v. Keri, 138 Fla. 527, 189 So. 866 (1939); Ellis v. Fairbanks,
38 Fla. 257, 21 So. 107 (1897); 2 JoNEs, MORTAGES § 1542 (8th ed. 1928).
4. See Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV.
1177, 1187 (1950).
5. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 40, § 122 (1935); ILL. ANN. STAT, C. 83, § 11(b)
(Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1949); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-623 (Burns 1933); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 582,14 (West 1945); MONT. REV. COnEs ANN. Tit. 52, § 206 (1947);
VA. CODE § 8-11 (1950).
6. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 95,29 (1949).
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a form of recording statute which would make any extensions subsequent
to the time limit set forth ineffective as to subsequent purchasers.7
Other states have chosen to treat the debt and the lien as so closely
connected as to be inseparable.8 Thus, these states have provided that
whenever the debt shall be barred by the applicable statute of limitation,
the lien is also no longer enforceable. Where such a statute is in effect,
the courts have not granted a retroactive application, on the basis that it
would be impossible to do so without impairing the contract right embodied
in the debt.'0 This idea of subjecting the lien to the same limitation as
the underlying debt has been applied in some jurisdictions even in the
absence of statute.11
Instead of directly applying a limitation to the lien, other states have
dealt procedurally with the problem. Thus, some statutes are intended
to create a presumption of payment after a certain lapse of time. 12 The
courts have held that such statutes- merely supply a rule of evidence. 13 In
the procedural vein, Connecticut has a statutory provision which is unique
in the field. 4 It provides that a mortgagor in possession may, after seven-
teen years, bring a petition to have the record title cleared of an undischarged
mortgage. Since the petition must be served upon all interested parties
there is no possibility of a contention of impairment of contract rights.
After the petition is served, the court may declare the mortgage invalid
and no action to enforce the mortgage may be maintained thereafter.
One type of statute which has attracted considerable attention recently
is that which does not set a period of limitation but rather defines what
shall constitute a marketable title.' Such a statute does more than ex-
tinguish a cause of action. Under its operation interests which may not
even be assertable by suit may be effectively extinguished. 16 But any interest
which it may bar is barred for the same reason that unrecorded deeds are
avoided in favor of subsequent purchasers; that is, it provides a result
sufficiently harsh to cause owners to. record. The effect of this type of
7. Magnuson v. Breher, 69 N.D. 197, 284 N.W. 853 (1939). See COLO. STAT.
ANN. c. 40, § 122 (1935) (upon failure to record within specified time the lien
shall have no more effect than an unrecorded instrument.").
8. See 2 JoNES, MORTGAGES § 1546 (8th ed. 1928).
9. Miss. CoDE Ar. § 719 (1942); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1017 (1939).
10. Bobb v. Taylor, 184 S.W. 1028 (Mo. 1916); Boyd v. Buchanan, 176 Mo.
App. 56, 162 S.W. 1075 (1914).
11. See Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, Supra note 4, at 1247.
12. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 8864 (1942), Boyd v. Boyd, 182 S.C. 498, 189 S.E.
794 (1937).
13. Aiken Mortgage & Realty Co. v. Altman, 182 S.C. 300, 189 S.E. 217 (1937).
14. CoN. GN. STAT, §. 7123 (1949). See Arnold v. Hollister, 131 Conn. 34,
37 A.2d 695 (1944) (to the effect that the Connecticut statute is not a statute of
limitation).
15. Mica. CoMp. LAws §§ 565.101.565.109 (1948). See Note, 33 MINN. L.
Rav. 54, 65 (1948).
16. See Aigler, Clearance of Land Titles - A Statutory Step, 44 MIcH. L. REv.
45 (1945).
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statute is probably limited to protection of subsequent purchasers, whereas
other statutes may constitute a complete bar.
Whatever the type of statute adopted, the puTpose is the same; namely,
the clearing of record titles so as to provide unrestricted marketability. A
state undoubtedly has the police power to pass legislation relating to the
recording of deeds' t in order to assure clear record title, and it should also
be able to provide for periods of limitation beyond which a claim may not
be enforceable. But where retroactive effect is to be given to the statute
some constitutional questions arise.
Retrospective legislation is not forbidden by the United States Con-
stitution,' 8 What is forbidden is the impariment of contractual obligations 9
and the deprivation of property without due process of law 20 So the ques-
tions usually to be resolved by a court in weighing the constitutionality of
retrospective legislation are-in respect to the validity of the statute-does
the legislation affect only a remedy, or a substantive right, and does an
existing law become a part of a contract and not subject to change? In
respect to the effect of the statute the questions become-is the statute in
effect a recording statute protecting only subsequent purchasers, and can
the statute be pleaded affirmatively or merely as a defense?
Much of the argument dealing with retrospective legislation has center-
ed around the distinction between a right and a remedy. If a vested right
is being impaired, then the statute is unconstitutional.21 But if only the
remedy is affected there is no constitutional question involved, since exist-
ing rules of evidence and judicial remedies are not considered as being
incorporated into the contract.2 2 It is generally held that laws existing at the
time of the contract are inviolable? 3 But these obligations are the reciprocal
rights arising from contracts and a legislature may control and change any
rights incidental to a contract.24 Thus, it is a proper exercise of sovereignty
to enact laws to alter or enlarge remedies for the violations of contracts.
To hold otherwise would be to hold that the contract implies, not only
that laws regulating the remedy are incorporated, but further, that such
laws cannot be changed and that the remedy is fixed at the time of contract
rather than at the time of perfecting the cause of action. 25 It has often
been held that there is no vested right in a statute of limitation of force
even when a cause of complaint accrues, 29 and the period allowed for suit
17. Lackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280 (U.S. 1830):
18. Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443 (1934). For a suggested classification
of constitutionally valid retrospective statutes, r.ee Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 74 F.
Supp. 412 (D. Md. 1947).
19. U. S. CONST. Art. 1, § 10.
20. U. S. CoNsr. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
21. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
22. Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U.S. 595 (1903).
23. Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 74 F. Supp. 412 (D. Md. 1947); Walters v.
Farmers' Life Ins. Co., 255 S.W. 666 (Tex. 1923).
24. Ibid.
25. Campbell v. Horne, 147 Fia. 523, 3 So.2d 125 (1941).
26. Silurian Oil Co: v. Essley, 54 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1932).
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may be shortened, provided a reasonable time is allowed for suit. -0 Such
decisions point out that a court has interpreted a lien as being only a
remedy by which the mortgagee may secure payment of the debt, and not
a substantive right within itself.28 Thus, a statute establishing a limitation
where none previously existed, or which shortens an existing limitation, may
operate on existing contracts since only the remedy is being affected.2"
These curative statutes have also been upheld as being recording acts.'0
Thus, it has been held that such a statute operates to clear public records
and does not impair prior rights.31 The effect of this type of statute has
been held to establish, not a limitation upon foreclosure, but a limitation
beyond which unrecorded extensions of a lien will not have the effect of
keeping the lien alive.3 2 Taking that view, the statutes are treated in the
same manner as recording statutes. It is certainly within the power of the
legislature to pass recording acts which provide that, if the prior deed is
not recorded within the limited time, it shall be ineffective as to subse-
quent purchasers. 3 This power of the legislature has been held to be the
same whether the deed is dated before or after the passage of the recording
act.84 Such considerations have been taken into account in determining the
power of a legislature to pass acts of limitation, and the effect of these
acts will depend upon the nature of the titles involved, and the emergencies
which led to their enactment.3 5.
Other statutes have been upheld, not as statutes of limitation, but as
statutes intended solely as declarations of rules of evidence to rebut a
presumption of payment.3 0 Rules of evidence are not vested rights and
may be changed by retroactive legislation.87 So, where a prior act had set
forth a presumption of payment and a subsequent act had marked twenty
years as the limit of the lien, it was held that the subsequent act was only
a change in presumption and, thus, merely an alteration of a rule of
evidence."
Regardless of the basis for justifying these statutes, whether on the
basis of the distinction between a right and a remedy, or as being a mere
change in a rule of evidence, or as being a recording statute, it is clear that
27. As to what has been considered a ieasonable time, see Steele v, Cann, 12;
S.W.2d 520 (Ark. 1939) (90 days); Vanderbilt v. Hegenian, 157 Misc. 908, 284 N.Y.
Supp. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (90 days); Kendall v. Keith Furnace Co., 162 F.2d 10032
(8th Cir. 1947) (the court will not inquire into the reasonableness of the time unless
manifestly insufficient).
28. Baccus v. Banks, 192 P.2d 683 (Okla. 1947).
29. Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245 (1890); McCloskey v. Eckart, 164 ,.2d
257 (5th Cir. 1947).
30. Gary.Wheaton Bank v. Helton, 337 Ill. A . 294, 85 N.E.2d 472 (1949).
31. Magnuson v. Breher, 69 N.D. 197, 284 N.W, 851
32. See note 30 supra.
33. See note 17 supra.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Boyd v. Boyd, 182 S.C. 498, 189 S.E. 794 (1937).
37. See note 13 supra.
38. Ibid.
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the statutes find their justification in necessity rather than in constitutional
logic."" Any form of limitation is, by its very terms, arbitrary, the person
having a valid reason for delay being barred the same as the person who
negligently delays bringing an action. However, though the differentiation
between substantive and procedural rights may not be clear cut, such differ-
entiation can be used as a suitable basis for decision when the court must
determine whether a rule is one in which stability is of prime importance
or if the rule is one in which flexibility is a more important value.' 0
Statutes limiting the lien of a mortgage have, in some instances, been
held to be unconstitutional. Where an actual transfer of ownership is
involved, a statute of limitation cannot operate retroactively. 1 There is a
wide distinction between requiring one, having a mere right to sue, to
pursue the right speedily, and converting an estate in possession into a
mere right of action and limiting the time for bringing the action. Thus,
one who is in actual or constructive possession of property is under no
obligation, nor can he be compelled, to take measures against an opposing
claimant; and a law depriving him of his property is in no sense a limita-
tion law but, rather, an unlawful confiscation.' 2 And, an act making an
unrecorded deed void unless recorded within a certain time has been held
invalid where no time was given the holder to record.48 The fact that the
act provided for a delay of six months before it would become effective
was not regarded as providing time for registering prior claims." Another
act was held unconstitutional where the life of the mortgage was limited
irrespective of the life of the debt it secured.' 5 The court held that it took
away the remedy without leaving a remedy of equal or similar value."6
While a distinction has been drawn betweenh laws relating to the rights of
parties and those applying only to the remedy, this doctrine is subject to
the limitation that a remedy must remain which is complete and secures all
the substantial rights of the parties.47 Thus, any law which amounts to a
39. Birkby v. Wilson, 92 Colo. 281, 19 P.2d 490 (1933). See Lutz v. Dutmer,
286 Mich. 467, 282 N.W. 431 (1938) (to the effect that such statutes should be
given a liberal interpretation).
40. See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 314 (1944). See
Holmes, J. in Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034
(1901) ("It may be that sometimes it would have been as well not to attempt to
make out that the judgment of the court was consistent with constitutional rules, if
such rules were to be taken to have the exactness of mathematics. It may be that it
would have been better to say definitely that constitutional rules, like those of the
common law, end in a penumbra where the Legislature has a certain freedom in fixing
the line, as has been recognized with regard to the police power.").
41. Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403 (1935); Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan.
568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949).
42. Leavenworth v. Claughton, 197 Miss. 606, 19 So.2d 815 (1944).
43. Farmers' Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks County Real Estate Co., 333 Pa.
390, 5 A.2d 94 (1939).
44. Ibid. Contra: Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373,
14 N.E. 586 (1887); Davis v. Savage, 50 N.M. 30, 168 P.2d 851 (1946).




denial of rights accruing under a contract, though professing to act only
on the remedy, is forbidden.4" Other retrospective statutes have been held
unconstitutional on the basis that insufficient time was provided for the
forfeiting of prior rights.'0
In the most recent decision concerning the validity of statutes eliminat-
ing the liens of.mortgages in default, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,51
in adopting the opinion of the lower court,' 2 found the Pennsylvania
statutes5" objectionable on two grounds. First, they required the bringing
of a court action where no controversy existed and, secondly, they applied
to mortgages still in force as well as to mortgages in default. This latter
objection was found to be valid in regard to perpetual mortgages issued
by railroad companies to secure bond issues, and also to ground rent estates,
a common law type of estate still existent in Pennsylvania.
Turning to the Florida statutes,' 4 it is obvious that the major objections
present in the Pennsylvania statutes are not of. concern to the Florida
court. First, Florida has no ground rent estates and, secondly, railroad
mortgages have been. specifically exempted from the operation of the
statutes.55 In addition, no court action is required by the Florida statutes,
in order to preserve a lien.56 Thus, it would seem only necessary to con-
sider the Florida court's past views on the general objections to retrospective
legislation. There is, however, an additional factor which must be taken
into consideration. Article III, section 33 of the Florida Constitution pro-
vides, "No statute shall be passed lessening the time, within which a civil
action may be commenced on any cause of action existing at the time of
its passage."
It is settled in Florida that the prohibition as to ex post facto laws
applies only to criminal cases. 7 And, the type of contract which is to be
protected against retroactive legislation is a voluntary contract based on
the assent of the parties involved. 5 Thus the court has found no objection
to curative acts which do not infringe upon any contractual right.5 But, a
statute which goes so far as to take away all remedies and leave no sub-
stantial remedy in place thereof would be void as impairing the obligation
of contracts.80 However, the extinguishment of a lien can hardly be classified
48. Ibid.
49. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877).
50. Blevins v. Northwest Carolina Util., Inc., 209 N.C. 683, 184 S.E. 517 (1936).
51. Girard Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 364 Pa. 576, 73 A.2d 371 (1950).
52. Girard Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., No. 2341, C.P. No. 5, Philadelphia
County, Pa., December term r949,
53. PA. STAT. AtN. Tit. 68, &§ 451-457 (Cum. Supp. 1949).
54. FLA. STAT. §§ 95.28-95.34 (1949).
55. FLA. STAT. § 95.32 (1949).
56. FLA. STAT. § 95.29 (1949).
57. Crooks v. State, 141 Fla. 597, 194 So. 237 (1940), Forbes Pioneer Boat Line
v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 80 Fla. 252, 86 So. 199 (1920), rev'd on other grounds,
258 U.S. 338 (1922).
58. Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 1 4 Fla. 710, 18 So.2d 775 (1944).
59. Charlotte Harbor & N. Ry. v. Welles, 78 Fla. 227, 82 So. 770 (1919).
60. Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Realty Co., 101 Fin, 1324, 135 So. 795 (1931).
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as curative legislation in the same manner as legislation providing for the
curing of technical defects in deeds after a certain lapse of time. The lien
isi a right whether substantive or remedial, and not an irregularity such as
a mere defect in the execution of a deed.
The meaning and extent of application of the aforementioned con-
stitutional provision must also be investigated." The purpose of this section
is to prevent a subsequent statute from having a retrospective effect by
reducing the statute of limitation after the statute has already begun to run
against a cause of action.6 2 This section has been held to prevent a reduc-
tion of time for bringing an action on a sealed instrument under a non-claim
statute. 3 Where, however, the retroactive statute reduced the period of
limitation in a non-claim statute from twelve to eight months, the court
felt it necessary to distinguish non-claim statutes from ordinary statutes
of limitation and limited the application of this provision to only general
statutes of limitation.84 The court indicated that even retroactive statutes,
affecting a general statute of limitation, would not be in violation of the
constitutional provision against impairment of contracts, but thought that
such a statute would not be valid in Florida in view of Article III, section
33. 5 Subsequent cases have pointed out that such a view would not be
applicable to causes of action where no previous period of limitation existed."6
To hold otherwise would in effect prevent any statute of limitation being
passed which affects existing rights if there was no applicable statute of
limitation in existence at the time the constitution of 1885 was adopted? '
An idea as to the views of the Florida court can be gathered from
the case of Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc.,68 which concerned the
validity of the retrospective application of a statute limiting the life of
contracts to purchase land. The court was of the opinion that one of their
functions must be to see whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate
end and the measures taken are reasonable. Recognizing that the contract
impairment clause 9 does not affect the police power of the state, the court
must consider the welfare of the people of the state as a whole. Even
though the remedial law in force at the time the contract is made is con-
sidered as entering into and becoming a part thereof, the parties have no
vested right in any particular remedy and the state may modify the remedy,
provided that another be substituted therefor."6 Thus, a statute which imposes
61. For a discussion of the applicability of FLA. CONST. Art. III, § 33 to FLA.
STr'. §§ 95.28-95.34 1949), see 22 FLA. L.4 . 153 (1948).
62. Lee v. Lang, M Ea. 782, 192 So. 490 (1940).
63. State Bank of Orlando & Trust Co. v. Macy, 101 Fla. 140, 133 So. 876 (1931).
64. In re Wood's Estate, 133 Fla. 730, 183 So. 10 (1938).
65. Ibid.
66. See Buck v. Triplett, 159 Fla. 741, 32 So.2d 753 (1947); Campbell v. Home,
147 Fla. 523, 524, 3 So.2d 125,'126 (1941).
67. Cam pbell v. Home, supra note 66, at 126.
68. 154 Pa. 710, 18 So.2d 775 (1944). See Tames Alexander, Inc. v. United States,
128 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1942) (discussion of retrospective aspects of Murphy deeds).
69. See note 19 supra.
70. Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 154 Fla. 710, 18 So.2d 775 (1944).
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additional duties upon the owner of a contract so that he must take certain
steps in order to preserve his rights is not void, provided that the statute
allows a reasonable time in which to take the necessary steps.
7'
The concurring opinion in the Mahood case directly attacked the
problem of the effect of Article III, section 33, and reached the conclusion
that where a reasonable time is provided for the pieservation or enforcement
of existing claims, a statute should not be held to violate this provision.
The court has placed much emphasis upon public policy and the
existing emergencies which necessitate such statutes. The land boom and
crash of the Twenties still affect our property,72 and statutes seeking to re-
move the impediments imposed by speculative contracting and mortgaging
should be considered in the light in which the United States Supreme
Court considered the Minnesota Moratorium on Mortgages, 73 that is, the
welfare of the state as a whole.
Regardless of the emergency which prompted the Florida statutes'"'
enactment, the legislature has taken the outstanding precautions to elim-
inate constitutional objections. Mortgagees were given the reasonable time
of one year to prosecute or extend their prior cla1ms, 7" the remedy of fore-
closure cannot be extinguished prior to the barring of the right contained
in the debtT6 and specific types of mortgages, used as security for bond
issues, were exempted from the operation of the statutes."
As for the possibility that the statute of limitation as to the debt may
be tolled by part payment, so that the lien might conceivably be extinguished
prior to a barring of the debt, the statutes may be considered as imposing
an additional duty upon the mortgagee. If the mortgagee wishes to allow
the statutes to be tolled in regard to the debt then he must take steps to
extend his lien too, and one year was provided for those already in that
situation. The remedy is changed, but it appears that an adequate remedy
remains.
In conclusion, Florida, in adopting a statute of limitation as a means
of eliminating "stale" mortgage liens, appears to have met the usual coi-
stitutional requirements in regard to retrospective statutes. A reasonable
time was provided for the enforcement or preservation of existing claims.
Special exceptions were made for certain types ef mortgages which would
71. Ibid.
72. See State v. Culbreath, 140 Fla. 634, 640, 192 So. 814, 819 (1939) (Tcrrellism-
"The pots of gold metamorphosed from town lots and cut over land by the optimism
and phychosis of that era changed suddenly to a medley of pyramided mortgages and
delinquent tax certificates.").
73. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
74. FLA. STAT. §§ 95.28-95.34 (1949).
75. FLA. STAT. § 95.34 (1949), FLA. STAT. § 95.31 (1949) specifically dcuics
any saving because of disabilities. Disability does not per se bestow inuinity. There
must be a legislative saving in such person's favor. See Vance v. Vance, 108 U.S. 514
(1883); Barbour v. Williams, 196 Miss. 409, 17 So.2d 604 (1944).
76. The period of limitation for a debt founded upon an instrmnct under seal
is twenty years. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(1) (1949).
77. FLA. STAT. § 95.32 (1949).
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othenvisc have been adversely affected. Mortgagees were provided with a
means of extending their liens by registration, there being no necessity for
court proceedings as in the invalid Pennsylvania law. The most serious
problem is the applicability of Article III, section 33 of the Florida Con-
stitution. But, the court has indicated that this provision would not be
applicable where no prior statute of limitation existed. Further, in Mahood
v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., the concurring justice expressed the view that
that constitutional provision is satisfied if a reasonable time is provided for
the enforcement of existing claims. In view of these opinions, it seems un-
likely that the Florida statutes will meet a fate of being declared unconstitu-
tional as did their Pennsylvania counterpart.
HERBEiRT A. WARREN
THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP
IN JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
There is considerable uncertainty as to whether the survivor of a joint
bank account or the personal representative of the deceased should receive
the funds of a joint account. The question has been clouded, so far as the
layman is concerned, by the adoption in nearly every state of "Deposit in
Two-Name" statutes.' Laymen are of the opinion that when they sign a
bank signature card, as demanded by these statutes, providing that the
funds are payable to either or survivor, they have made all the arrangements
for their co-depositor to receive the funds upon death. Actually, these
statutes merely protect the bank in case of payment to the survivor after
the death of the joint depositor.
It is proposed to show, first, the modern theories used in deciding
whether or not the survivor of a joint 'ccount will receive the account;
secondly, the problem as it exists under the Florida decisions; and thirdly,
a suggestion as to how Florida might clarify the joint account dilemma.
When the common law was first formulating in England, personal
property was of relatively little importance. Men of wealth had many acres
of land, but only a few personal effects. As a result the law of the time was
predominantly concerned with realty. Real property could be held in four
different ways: in severalty, in joint-tenancy, in coparcenary and in coin-
mon.2 Each of these theories had requirements which had to be met before
the estate could have legal effect.8 One of the primary reasons for deter-
mining the type of estate that existed was to establish the rights of survivor-
I. Every state except Kentucky has "Deposit in Two-Name Acts." See, e.g., FLA.
SrAT. § 653.16 (1949). These acts provide that the signing of a signature card, which
states that the account is payable to X or Y o survivor, protects the bank ill paying
the survivor after the death of a joint depositor.
2. 2 BL. CONIM. '343
3. Ibid.
